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THE EXPANDING JURISDICTION OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION: VARIABLE ANNUITIES AND
BANK COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT FUNDS
The Securities and Exchange Commission is presently attempting to
assert jurisdiction over certain aspects of two industries traditionally exempt
from federal securities regulation-insurance and bank.ing.1 The SEC
claims that two recently developed investment vehicles-variable annuities
in the insurance field and pooled funds of managing agency accounts in
the banking field-are virtually the same as mutual funds, which are subject
to SEC regulation under the Investment Company Act of 1940. (A mutual
fund is essentially a fund (usually in corporate form), the participants'
contributions to which are collectively invested in a portfolio of securities,
each participation representing a pro rata interest therein.2) The SEC also
asserts that participations in these new investment vehicles are "securities"
as that term is defined in the Securities Act of 1933,8 and thus should be
registered under that act. In a related move, the SEC has taken the position
that pension funds created under the Self-Employed Individuals' Tax
Retirement Act of 19624 (popularly known as "H.R. IO"), when pooled by
banks for collective investment purposes, are also "securities" subject to
registration under the Securities Act, although the SEC has hesitantly con1 Bank securities and insurance policies (but not insurance company stock) are
specifically exempted from the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77(a)•(aa) (1958 &: Supp. IV, 1963) [hereinafter cited as Securities Act], by Securities
Act §§ 3(a)(2), (8). Insurance companies and banks are specifically exempted from the
Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 789, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80(a-l)-(a-52)
(1958) [hereinafter cited as Investment Company Act], by Investment Company Act
§ 3(c)(3).
The specific problems of variable annuities and bank collective investment funds were
not covered in the recently completed Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
Conversely, this comment will deal neither with the problems in the banking and insurance
areas covered in the Special Study nor with the proposed legislation affecting those areas
engendered by the Study.
2 An "investment company" is defined, inter alia, as an issuer which is engaged
primarily in the business of "investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities." Investment
Company Act § 3(a)(l). The typical mutual fund is technically a "diversified management
investment company." Investment Company Act §§ 4(3), 5(b)(l). Mutual funds are
of two types: "Open-end," where the shares are purchased from and redeemed by the
fund itself, and "closed-end," where the assets and shares outstanding are fixed and the
shares are traded on exchanges and over the counter. Open-end funds comprise the
bulk of mutual funds today. For an excellent description of mutual funds and their
operation, see Lobell, The Mutual Fund: A Structural Analysis, 47 VA. L. REv.
181 (1961).
s Securities Act § 2(1).
4 76 Stat. 809, codified in scattered sections of the !NT. REv. CODE OF 1954. This act
extends certain tax advantages to self-employed persons who provide for their retirement
by making contributions to a fund created for this purpose. The fund may be invested
in insurance, variable annuities, investment company shares, or a trust of which a bank
is trustee. The amount of the annual contribution which may be made to each such trust
and which receives tax benefits is limited.
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ceded that these funds are exempted from the Investment Company Act.5
This comment will examine the validity of these claims and explore possible
solutions to the controversies which they have engendered.
I.

THE INVESTMENT VEHICLES INVOLVED

The variable annuity is basically a device whereby the purchaser makes
periodic payments of fixed amounts over a period of years (the "pay-in"
period), the proceeds of which, after certain deductions, are invested in a
portfolio of securities. At each payment, the purchaser is credited with
"units" representing his proportionate interest in this fund. The value of
these units, and thus the number of units which can be purchased with a
given dollar amount, will fluctuate, essentially depending on the investment results of the fund. During the pay-in period, the purchaser has the
right to terminate the contract and receive the value of all units credited
to his account, less certain termination charges. At the end of the pay-in
period, the purchaser has the option of receiving a lump-sum payment
representing the value of his units at that time or of receiving periodic payments for a fixed number of years or for the duration of his life (the "payout" period). If the program of payments for life is chosen, the number of
units composing each periodic payment thereafter to be made to the
annuitant is fixed at the beginning of the pay-out period. This is done
by the same actuarial calculations which go into the fixing of the amount
of periodic payments on a conventional annuity contract. Assume, for a
simple illustration, that at the beginning of the pay-out period the purchaser has accumulated 2,400 units and it is actuarially estimated that he
will live for twenty years. The monthly annuity payment to him will thus
represent ten units. Each month he will receive the value, at the time the
company makes payment, of ten units. The fluctuation in unit value is
the investment risk assumed solely by the purchaser. The chance that he
will live longer than twenty years, and so receive more units out of the
fund than he put in, is the mortality risk assumed by the company selling
the variable annuity contract. 6 Thus, a variable annuity contract contains
both an investment, or "securities" feature, and also a traditional insurance
feature. Variable annuities, first utilized in 1952,7 were devised to avoid
5 The SEC makes this concession in view of § 3(c)(l3) of the Investment Company Act,
which exempts "any employees' stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing trust." Hearings
on Conflict in Federal Regulation of Common Trust Funds Before a Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Government Operations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings]. See also Wall Street J., Dec. 26, 1963, p. 2, col. 3. Why the SEC makes
this concession is not clear. It seems that the SEC could have argued persuasively that the
exemption applies only to each separate pension trust individually, and that, when these
various trusts are pooled, the resulting fund is not itself a "pension trust" and thus not
exempted.
6 There is of course a reciprocal mortality risk, assumed by the purchaser of a straight
variable annuity, that he may die before he has recovered his full 2,400 units in payments.
7 The first variable annuity fund was the College Retirement Equities Fund, which
was established by a special act of the New York legislature and began operations in
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paying annuitants in depreciated dollars, the theory being that returns
from investments in common stocks would, over the long run, tend to
balance the effects of inflation.8
A managing agency account is an arrangement pursuant to which a
customer leaves money with a bank, directing the bank to invest it for
him in the bank's discretion. The pooling of these accounts for investment
purposes in a "common trust fund" is an innovation only recently made
possible by a new regulation (Regulation 9) promulgated by the Comptroller of the Currency in April 1963.9 (This regulation also permits the
pooling of H.R. IO pension funds. 10) Congress had transferred authority
over the trust activities of national banks from the Federal Reserve Board
to the Comptroller of the Currency in September 1962.11 Prior to that time,
such trust activities had been governed by the Federal Reserve Board's
Regulation F, which permitted the maintenance of common trust funds
by national banks, but prohibited the use of such funds for "other than
fiduciary purposes.''12 As a matter of practice, and apparently in deference
to the foregoing cautionary language of Regulation F, managing agency
accounts were not pooled.13 Thus, because of the expense involved, banks
were rarely willing to handle such an account amounting to less than
100,000 dollars.14 With the newly permitted pooling of these accounts,
much smaller amounts can profitably be handled.
1952. Morrissey, Dispute Over the Variable Annuit)', 35 Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.-Feb. 1957,
pp. 75-76.
s This theory may not be entirely valid. Some insurance spokesmen who oppose the
variable annuity declare that past experience has not shown a true correlation between
the cost-of-living index and common stock prices and that there is no assurance of any
such correlation in the future. See id. at 77-78; Note, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 206, 207 n.16.
For a good description of variable annuities and their operation, see Johnson, The
Variable Annuity: What It Is and Why It Is Needed, 1956 !Ns. L.J. 357.
9 12 C.F.R. §§ 9.1-9.19 (Supp. 1964) [hereinafter cited as Regulation 9]. Section 9.18(a)(ll)
of Regulation 9 specifically permits the pooling of managing agency accounts for investment purposes. The terminology used in this section was amended slightly in February
1964. See note 35 infra.
10 Regulation 9, § 9.18(a)(2).
11 Act of September 28, 1962, 76 Stat. 668, 12 U.S.C. § 92(a) (Supp. IV, 1963). Since
the Comptroller already had supervisory authority over the national banks' trust activities,
it was believed that he should also have authority to regulate those activities; this was
the sole reason given for the transfer of authority. 2 U.S. CODE CONG. &: ADM. NEWS 2735,
2736 (1962).
12 Federal Reserve Board, Regulation F § 17(a), 2 Fed. Reg. 2976 (1937). The Board's
conception of the limits of permissible "fiduciary purpose" use of common trust funds
was made clear in a subsequent ruling which stated:
"The Board intended that a common trust fund should be used merely to aid in the
administration of trusts by a trust institution through the commingled investment of
funds of various trusts. While the operation of a common trust fund might thus enable
a trust institution to accept small trusts which it otherwise would be unwilling to
handle, it was contemplated that trust guise or form should not be used to enable
a trust institution to operate a common trust fund as an investment trust attracting
money seeking investment alone and to embark upon what would be in effect the
sale of participations in a common trust fund to the public as investments." 26 FED.
REsER.VE BULL. 393 (1940).
13 Hearings, app. B2, at 108.
14 Hearings 53.
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THE VALIDITY OF THE JURISDICTIONAL CLAIMS OF THE SEC

A. The Law
Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 defines "security," in relevant
part, as:
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit sharing agreement . . . investment contract, voting trust certificate, certificate of
deposit for a security • . . or, in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a 'security,' or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, or warrant or right
to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing."
The language of this section is extremely broad, and both variable annuity
contracts and participations in a common trust fund could fall within a
literal construction of such terms as "investment contract," "certificate of
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement," or, presumably,
"any interest ... commonly known as a 'security.' " Proponents of the variable annuity, however, pointed to certain statutory exemptions, noted
above.111 Section 3(a)(8) of the Securities Act specifically exempts from the
act "any insurance or endowment policy or annuity contract or optional
annuity contract.'' Section 3(c)(3) of the Investment Company Act unqualifiedly exempts any "insurance company" from the act's provisions.
Finally, there is a provision in the McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act, passed shortly after the Supreme Court had removed any constitutional doubt as to the federal government's power to regulate insurance,16 which states that "no Act of Congress shall be construed to
invalidate, impair or supersede any law enacted by any State for the
purpose of regulating the business of insurance.'' 17 In 1959 the issue of
whether variable annuity contracts are "securities" came squarely before
the United States Supreme Court in SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.
of America (the "VALIC" case).18 The Court held, in a five-to-four decision, that variable annuity contracts are "securities" which must be registered under the Securities Act of 1933; furthermore, a company which deals
solely in these contracts is not qualified for the "insurance company"
exemption in the Investment Company Act of 1940, and so is subject to
regulation under that act. The Court stated that such contracts are not
"insurance" policies or "annuity" contracts within the meaning of the
Securities Act's exemption, and that the company therefore is neither an
"insurance company" within the meaning of the Investment Company
llS See note 1 supra and accompanying text. The proponents' arguments were
thoroughly presented and discussed in SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America,
359 U.S. 65 (1959). See text accompanying notes 18-19 infra.
16 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
17 McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act § 2(b), 59 Stat. 34 (1945), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1012(b) (1958).
18 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
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Act's exemption nor engaged in the "business of insurance" as that term is
used in the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The Court's reasoning was as follows:
"[T]he concept of insurance involves some investment risk-taking on
the part of the company. The risk of mortality, assumed here, gives
these variable annuities an aspect of insurance. Yet it is apparent, not
real; superficial, not substantial. In hard reality the issuer of a variable annuity that has no element of a fixed return assumes no true
risk in the insurance sense .... [I]n common understanding 'insurance'
involves a guarantee that at least some fraction of the benefits will
be payable in fixed amounts ...."10
The VALIC case left unsettled, however, the important question of
whether a large insurance company, doing only a small portion of its
business in variable annuities, could qualify for the "insurance company"
exemption. The Investment Company Act defines the "insurance company"
which it exempts as "a company which is organized as an insurance company, whose primary and predominant business activity is the writing of
insurance . . . and which is subject to supervision by the insurance commissioner or a similar official or agency of a State . . • ."20 The SEC has
conceded that a company writing diverse forms of insurance qualifies for
this exemption,21 but there is another obstacle. The SEC claims that, when
a variable annuity fund is set up, the fund itself is an entity separate from
the insurance company and is the "investment company" and the "issuer"
of the "security" interests in the fund. Under this "fund-issuer" theory, the
fund itself must comply with the provisions of the Investment Company
Act. That act clearly provides that an "investment company" may be "a
corporation, a partnership, an association, a joint-stock company, a trust,
a fund, or any organized group of persons whether incorporated or not,"22
but it gives no clue as to which entity-the corporation or the fundshould be considered the "issuer" of such an interest as a variable annuity.28
Nevertheless, as a matter of common usage, "issuer" usually designates the
person or entity against which an investor has some enforceable claim for
a pro rata share of the assets owned by that person or entity. The holder
of a variable annuity contract, if he does not outlive the actuarial prediction, has no claim against the assets of the company; rather he has a
claim only against the assets of the variable annuity fund. In such circumstances it seems logical to treat the fund, rather than the company,
as the issuer.24 This "fund-issuer" theory creates a number of problems for
Id. at 71.
Investment Company Act§ 2(a)(l7). (Emphasis added.)
Prudential Ins. Co. of America, SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8620,
Jan. 22, 1968.
22 Investment Company Act § 2(a)(8).
23 "'Issuer' means every person who issues or proposes to issue any security, or has
outstanding any security which it has issued." Investment Company Act § 2(a)(21). The
definition of "issuer" in Securities Act § 2(4) is similarly unhelpful.
24 It is conceded that, if the investor outlives his actuarial prediction, his claim becomes
19
20
21
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the large insurance company, the principal one being that a key provision
of the Investment Company Act requires that the directors of an "investment company" fund be elected solely by the holders of the securities in
that fund. 25 In a recent proceeding, the SEC applied the "fund-issuer"
theory to a proposed sale of variable annuity contracts by the Prudential
Insurance Company.26 Prudential, in light of the V ALIC case, had agreed
to register the contracts as "securities" under the Securities Act, but it
claimed that it was exempt from the Investment Company Act. The SEC
rejected Prudential's arguments that (1) the insurance company, not the
fund, was the issuer; (2) the act governs only relationships organized in the
form of some legal entity; (3) the term "fund" as used in the act was
not meant to apply to such a "lifeless thing, incapable of action"; and
(4) the act was not meant to apply to a "minor activity" of an already
established company. The SEC's position that the fund did not qualify
for the "insurance company" exemption was supported by the drawing of
an analogy to the banking exemptions contained in the same statute. Although the Investment Company Act specifically exempts banks,27 it nevertheless goes on separately to exempt common trust funds maintained by
banks.28 This statutory structure was held to raise a potent implication that
Congress did not intend separate funds maintained by banks to be exempt
unless a specific exemption for a particular fund was stated in the act; the
SEC extended this implication to separate funds maintained by insurance
companies. Prudential petitioned the Third Circuit for review, and, in
January 1964 that court affirmed the position taken by the SEC.211 Reviewing the legislative history of the Investment Company Act, the court decided
that variable annuities partake of the nature of the investments which
Congress was seeking to control. The court noted that Congress intended
to make a functional, rather than an institutional, distinction, and that
this intent was emphasized by the specific exemption for bank common
trust funds.so Although the "fund-issuer" theory appears logically valid
and has received the unqualified imprimatur of the Third Circuit, there
one against the company, since the company assumes the mortality risk. Thus the "fundissuer" theory breaks down in regard to a particular variable annuity once the annuitant
has outlived his actuarial prediction. However, the critical time for the categorization of
an interest with respect to both the Securities Act and the Investment Company Act
begins with issuance and continues as long as the annuitant's investment risk continues.
Upon the annuitant's outliving of his actuarial prediction, he has recovered all of the
units representing his investment; he is no longer taking an investment risk, and he no
longer has need of the protection of the federal government. Cf. note 83 infra.
Investment Company Act § 16(a).
Prudential Ins. Co. of America, SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 3620,
Jan. 22, 1963.
27 Investment Company Act § 3(c)(3).
25
26

28
20

Ibid.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. SEC, 326 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1964).

so Mr. Justice Brennan has likewise stated that Congress was making a

functional

distinction in the Securities and Investment Company Acts. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life
Ins. Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65, 76 (1959) (concurring opinion).
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is still room for argument. The Investment Company Act specifically provides that, to qualify for the act's insurance exemption, a company need
only be one whose "primary and predominant" business is insurance.81
It could therefore be argued that Congress definitely contemplated the
possibility of a company with a sideline in investment activities but nevertheless chose to exempt it.
The ultimate judicial fate of the "fund-issuer" theory in the insurance
area will undoubtedly have an impact in the banking field, where the SEC
is seeking to apply the theory to the newly permitted pooling of managing
agency accounts. Since the Investment Company Act specifically exempts
both banks and insurance companies when their businesses are predominantly banking and insurance, respectively,82 the arguments for and against
applicability of the theory would seem to be virtually the same in both
areas. But, even assuming that the "fund-issuer" theory is applicable in
the banking area, the SEC must dispose of another obstacle before it can
assert jurisdiction over these pooled accounts under the Investment Company Act. This is the act's exemption, just noted, of "any common trust
fund or similar fund maintained by a bank exclusively for the collective
investment and reinvestment of moneys contributed thereto by the bank
in its capacity as a trustee, executor, administrator, or guardian."88 More
specifically, the question of whether common trust funds of managing
agency accounts are exempt will depend on whether these accounts are
held by the bank "in its capacity as trustee." The Comptroller of the Currency interprets "trustee" as referring broadly to any fiduciary capacity,
and he claims that, when a bank receives money to be placed in a managing
agency account, it is acting in such a fiduciary capacity.84 The SEC reads
"trustee" in a much narrower sense, excluding not only the managing
agency relationship, but even a revocable inter vivos trust of which the
settlor is the beneficiary.35 The SEC feels that such arrangements lack a
81 See note 20 supra and accompanying text. Investment Company Act § 2(a)(5)
contains a similar provision regarding banks. See note 32 infra.
82 While the insurance company exemption depends on a "primary and predominant"
test, note 31 supra, the banking exemption applies to a bank "a substantial portion
of the business of which consists of receiving deposits or exercising fiduciary powers."
Investment Company Act § 2(a)(5).
33 Investment Company Act § 3(c)(3).
34 Hearings 36-37. It is interesting to note that some leaders of the banking industry,
not sharing the Comptroller's view, frankly admit that a managing agency account does
not involve a fiduciary relationship. See id. app. B7, at 122.
35 Letter from Allan F. Conwill, Director of the Division of Corporate Regulation
of the SEC, to the author, March 26, 1964, on file with .Michigan Law Review. See also
Hearings 6, 36-37. In February 1964 the Comptroller amended § 9.18(a)(3) of Regulation 9,
the section which permits pooling of managing agency accounts. That section now allows
national bank funds to be invested collectively:
"in a common trust fund, maintained by the bank exclusively J.or the collective investment and reinvestment of monies contributed thereto by the bank in its capacity
as managing agent under a managing agency agreement expressly providing that such
monies are received by the bank in trust." 29 Fed. Reg. 1719 (1964). (Amending
language in italics.)
This amendment was apparently required by the Internal Revenue Service as a condition
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"bona fide fiduciary purpose." It should be recalled that the Federal Reserve
Board's old Regulation F prohibited only the utilization of common trust
funds for other than fiduciary purposes.86 If, as the Comptroller contends,
managing agency accounts are received in a fiduciary capacity, the banks'
abstention from pooling these accounts under Regulation F is indeed difficult to explain.87 As a matter of purely legal definition, the meaning of
"trustee" cannot be pinned down, since the term "trust" is used by courts
and lawyers in a variety of senses,88 and the availability of the common
trust fund exemption for such pooled accounts will therefore ultimately
depend on a court's interpretation of the purposes of the Investment Company Act.39
The SEC is also claiming that interests in the pooled funds of managing
agency accounts are "securities" required to be registered under the Securities Act, even though that act specifically exempts securities issued by
a bank. 40 The SEC again applies its "fund-issuer" theory and claims that
the fund, rather than the bank, is the issuer. Here the theory runs into difficulty because, under the Securities Act definitions, the list of entities
which may be issuers does not include a "fund," although it does include
a "trust." 41 But, even if the SEC prevails on its "fund-issuer" theory here,
it must clear yet another hurdle before it can require registration under
the Securities Act. That hurdle is the act's exemption of "transactions ...
not involving any public offering." 42 Common trust funds have existed for
years, and yet, until the promulgation of the Comptroller's Regulation 9
in 1963, the SEC had never required participations in these funds to be
registered under the Securities Act. Although the SEC has always considered these participations to be securities, it took the position that, as
long as the "bona fide fiduciary purpose" requirement of the Federal
Reserve Board's Regulation F was adhered to, there was no "public offering.''48 But, since the SEC believes that Regulation 9 has no requirement of a "bona fide fiduciary purpose" comparable to that of Regulation
F,44 the Commission fears that "merchandising," or a general public offerprecedent to an income tax exemption for such funds. The favorable tax ruling, phrased
in substantially the same language, appeared a few weeks later. Rev. Rul. 64-59, 1964
INT. R.Ev. BuLL. No. 8, at 12. This slight addition of language has not caused the SEC
to alter its position. See Letter from Allan F. Conwill, supra.
aa See note 12 supra.
37 Except perhaps as an excess of caution which the Comptroller is now anxious to
discourage.
88 1 Scarr, TRUSTS § 2 (2d ed. 1956).
30 To be discussed in Part II-B infra.
40 Securities Act § 3(a)(2).
41 Securities Act §§ 2(2), (4). But even if this distinction causes a denial of SEC
jurisdiction under the Securities Act, this is not crucial. If the SEC prevails under the
Investment Company Act, under which a fund can be an issuer, it can still require a
Securities Act form of registration. See Investment Company Act§ 8(b){4).
42 Securities Act § 4(1).
43 Hearings 4; id. app. BIS, at 167-68.
44 But see note 35 supra.
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ing, of these managing agency accounts is inevitable.45 Of course, the banks
could restrict their availability to certain select customers, but, in the
absence of a definite regulation and in view of the attractiveness of the
lucrative mutual fund business, such self-restraint seems unlikely. The
same fear of "merchandising" is behind the SEC's claim that interests in
any pool of H.R. IO pension funds of the self-employed must be registered
under the Securities Act.46 But the SEC's fears respecting these pension
fund pools appear less solidly grounded. The pension funds must be set
up under an elaborate trust arrangement with the bank,47 and they are not
terminable at will. 48 These restrictions preclude such a fund's developing
into a mutual fund type of investment vehicle available to the general
public, and they impart to the arrangement a "bona fide fiduciary purpose."49 Indeed, it is questionable whether there is any distinction in substance between these pension fund pools and the old type of common trust
fund set up under the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation F, about which
funds the SEC had no complaint.50

B. Analysis of Present Regulation
As far as the letter of the law is concerned, the SEC's jurisdictional
claims are probably valid (with a possible exception as to H.R. IO pension
fund pools). However, since that validity is somewhat less than clear-cut,
an analysis of the existing regulation of these investment vehicles, in light
of the purposes of the statutes involved, should be undertaken. The basic
philosophy of the Securities Act is one of full disclosure-with the purpose
of enabling the investor to make an intelligent appraisal of the risks involved before he commits his funds. 51 The Investment Company Act is
similarly aimed at full disclosure, 52 but it seeks also to effect a number of
45 Hearings 8. For a recent statement of the SEC's position on what constitutes a
"public offering," see SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552, Nov. 6, 1962. It should be noted
that § 9.18(b)(5)(iv) of Regulation 9 prohibits advertisement of these collective investment
funds. However, the SEC has pointed out that there are other methods by which their
availability can be made known to the public (e.g., dispersion through the private contacts
of bank employees). Hearings 8.
46 Id. at 6-7.
47 The trust arrangement is outlined in great detail. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 401.
48 No benefits may be paid to the self-employed person until he has attained 59-1/2
years of age. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 40l(d)(4)(B).
49 See text accompanying notes 42-43 supra.
50 Although there may be no difference between the two in terms of substantive
structure, it is possible that the pension fund pools will far outstrip the old type of
common trust funds in sheer size and number. This is because tax-deferred pension
contributions are financially attractive, and large numbers of self-employed persons will
probably wish to take advantage of this device. This factor, rather than any superficial
distinction in the type of trust arrangements involved, is probably the main reason for
the SEC's feeling that the protection of the Securities Act is needed where it was not
needed before. See Hearings 6-7.
51 H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933); S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1933); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 77 (1959) (concurring opinion
of Brennan, J.).
52 See, e.g., the registration requirements of § 8.
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other important purposes, the principal ones being connected with ultimate control of fund activities by the participants therein and the prevention of self-dealing by the directors, at the fund's expense, for the
benefit of other enterprises with which they may be affiliated.tis These purposes are accomplished by giving the participants the right to elect. the
directors of the fund 154 and to control changes in investment policy,155 and
by placing restrictions on the affiliations of the directors56 and on transactions with affiliated persons and companies.157 The legislative history
of the Investment Company Act shows that it was drafted principally on
the basis of reports submitted by the SEC after an extensive investigation
undertaken at the request of Congress.58 This history is of little help in
determining whether Congress would have intended to include such investment vehicles as variable annuities and pooled managing agency accounts
within the insurance and banking exemptions had these vehicles existed
at the time. However, in describing the nature of the investment enterprises
which Congress was seeking to control, the House Report quotes from the
testimony of SEC Commissioner Healy, who stated that "essentially these
organizations are large liquid pools of the public's savings entrusted to
managements to be invested." 59 Moreover, in connection with the banking
exemption, it is noteworthy that the Senate Report, in discussing the problems sought to be remedied by the legislation, stated that "commercial
banks are in a position to dominate the board of directors and control
the management of investment companies; and thus, when they are unscrupulous, to advance their own pecuniary interests at the expense of
the investment companies and their security holders." 60
Given the foregoing indications of the intended scope of the acts and
of the possibilities for abuse, the proper inquiry now becomes whether, in
light of the statutory purposes mentioned above, present regulation of insurance and banking is sufficient to warrant the exemption of variable
annuities and pooled managing agency accounts from the federal securities
laws. 01 Insurance regulation today is conducted entirely by the states. In
general, state insurance regulation is aimed at preservation of principal
and production of a steady income so that the constantly maturing claims
58 The evils which the Investment Company Act was designed to prevent are
listed in § l(b).
54 Investment Company Act § 16.
511 Investment Company Act § 13.
56 Investment Company Act § 10.
57 Investment Company Act §§ 17, 21.
118 H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 5-6 (1940); S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d
Sess. 5 (1940).
159 H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 6 (1940).
60 S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 7 (1940).
01 For an analysis of present regulation in these two areas and its effectiveness in
protecting the general shareholders of banking and insurance corporations (as distinguished
from the holders of shares in special funds), see Report of Special Study of Securities
Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. pt. 3, at 35-42 (1963).
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of policyholders can be met. This aim is accomplished by regulating the
capital structure, requiring maintenance of proper reserves, and limiting
the type of investments which may be made by insurance companies.62 To
the holder of a standard insurance policy the company assumes a fixed obligation which cannot be reduced by any dip in the stock market. Since the
insured assumes no investment risk, disclosure is unnecessary for the protection of his interests. Likewise, the policyholder has no need to control
the composition of the board of directors or the investment policy because,
assuming the continued solvency of the company, his claim cannot be reduced by mismanagement or unwise investment policy. But, when the
policyholder does assume an investment risk, as he does under a variable
annuity contract, these factors take on a direct significance. Yet, under
traditional insurance regulation, the prospective contract holder has no
means of comparing the investment performance of several variable annuity funds, and, once committed, he is virtually helpless to prevent unwise
investment policy or mismanagement of the fund. The company could
remain solidly solvent while, at the same time, a stock market drop could
leave the purchaser of a variable annuity contract holding nothing but a
greatly devalued piece of paper. Thus, present insurance regulation is insufficient to warrant exemption of variable annuities from the protective
strictures of the federal securities laws. 68
Regulation of the banking industry has not traditionally been focused
on shareholder protection; rather, the prime interest has been the protection of depositors. 64 As in the insurance industry, the main objective is
the continued solvency of the institution. Regulation of the trust activities
of national banks is now vested exclusively in the Comptroller of the Currency. 65 All regulation of common trust funds of pooled managing agency
accounts is thus found in the Comptroller's new Regulation 9. 66 Although
that regulation contains some minimum reporting requirements, it does not
require that a prospectus be supplied, and even the information which
62 PATIERSON, INSURANCE I.Aw §§ 3-4 (2d ed. 1957). Since most states limit the portion
of an insurance company's assets which may be invested in common stocks, one might
suppose that this would prevent the establishment of a variable annuity fund, which is
usually invested entirely in common stocks. But this is not the case with a company the
size of Prudential. Suppose, for example, that state law limits Prudential's common stock
investments to 10% of its assets. If in fact Prudential has only 3% of its assets presently
invested in common stocks, it can set up a variable annuity fund invested solely in common stocks as long as the amount of the fund does not exceed 7% of the company's total
assets.
68 Compare Kimball, Regulation of Specialty Policies in Life Insurance, 62 Mice. L.
REV. 167, 226 (1963).
64 Hearings 9.
65 See note II supra and accompanying text.
66 Although the Comptroller has direct authority over national banks only, Regulation
9 actually affects all banks (state and national) which establish common trust funds. This
is because INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 584 gives a federal income tax exemption only to
those common trust funds which comply with the regulations governing common trust
funds of national banks. It would be financially inconceivable to establish a common trust
fund without such a tax exemption.
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the investor can obtain upon request does not provide sufficient material
for intelligent investment analysis.67 Nor does Regulation 9 require that
the participants in the fund elect its directors or control the investment
policy. Since, in these and a number of other respects, Regulation 9 falls
far short of the investor safeguards of the federal securities laws, 68 the fact
of regulation by the Comptroller does not warrant an exemption from those
laws.
III.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

A. Judicial

If the present jurisdictional controversy is settled in the courts-a
solution strongly urged by the Comptroller of the Currency69-the effect
on the industries and investment vehicles involved is likely to be unsatisfactory to both sides. If the claims of the SEC are upheld,70 compliance
with the Securities Act will pose no real problem. It will bring about merely
the added cost of registration,11 and it is unlikely that large insurance and
banking corporations would balk at such an expense.72 But the Investment
67 Chairman Cary of the SEC has outlined the disclosure shortcomings of Regulation 9
as follows:
"In lieu of requiring that each prospective participant in a bank-sponsored mutual
fund be given a prospectus, the regulation provides that the bank shall keep a copy
of the written plan in accordance with which it is established at its principal office
(it need not be available at branch offices) and that, upon request, a prospective
participant shall be furnished a copy of the plan.
"The regulation requires the plan to set out the rights of the participant in the
fund. However, it does not appear to require that a specifically defined investment
policy be set forth; or that fees and other charges payable by the fund be stated;
or that a balance sheet and income statement for a recent period be included; or
that the investments of the funds be listed (with a statement of the fund's assets in
major fields and a showing of the unrealized appreciation or depreciation in the
portfolio); or that transactions with affiliated persons be disclosed." Hearings IO.
68 One of the main problems which the Investment Company Act was designed to
solve was that of self-dealing by the directors of the company. Section 9.12 of Regulation 9
sets out rules which are designed to prevent self-dealing and which roughly parallel
some of the provisions against self-dealing found in § 17 of the Investment Company Act.
But Chairman Cary of the SEC has pointed out the inadequacy of the § 9.12 provisions:
"[A]Il or part of the rules set out in section 9.12 can apparently be negated by
exculpatory provisions in the agreement between the bank and the investor. Moreover,
to the extent that local law permits any of the activities forbidden by section 9.12,
the prohibitions of section 9.12 are overridden. The rules set forth in section 9.12
themselves do not appear to prevent or place any restrictions around investments by
the bank-sponsored mutual fund in companies to which the bank has loans outstanding-the mutual fund could be used to provide the cushion for bank loans."
Hearings 11.
For an analysis of numerous other respects in which Regulation 9 does not provide the
Investment Company Act safeguards (such as failure to require an unaffiliated director),
see id. at 11-13.
69 Statement of James J. Saxon, Comptroller of the Currency, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
11 76901 (1963).
70 Of course, if all of the SEC's claims are held invalid, the controversy disappears.
11 The SEC has prepared a short form registration statement for H.R. 10 pension fund
offerings. Hearings app. Bl9, at 168. This should reduce somewhat the expenses of
registration.
72 In the Prudential case, Prudential had already agreed to register its variable annuity
contracts under the Securities Act. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. SEC, 326 F.2d 383,
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Company Act apparently deals a fatal blow, for one of the key provisions
of that act requires, as noted above, that the directors of the fund be
elected solely by the participants in the fund. 73 The SEC has made it clear
that it considers this provision "in a large part the very essence of that Act"
and that in no situation would it grant an exemption from the requirement. 74 This means that a separate corporation with separate directors
must be set up by every insurance company wishing to sell variable annuity
contracts and by every bank wishing to pool managing agency accounts. Such
a requirement would in many instances be unworkable,75 and, as a practical
matter, many banks and insurance companies will forget the whole matter,
thereby leaving utilization of these investment vehicles entirely to the standard investment companies. Another problem arising from a judicial solution upholding the SEC's jurisdiction would be the overlap of regulation
of banks by two federal agencies, the SEC and the Comptroller. Such an
overlap, unplanned and unorganized by Congress, would result in an inevitable waste of government resources by duplication76 and the possibility
of an unseemly pitting of agency against agency. While these problems
suggest the inadequacy of a judicial solution, there is a still more compelling
reason to avoid the judicial route. These investment vehicles were neither
in existence nor even contemplated when Congress passed the Securities Act
and the Investment Company Act. Although both arrangements closely
resemble investment devices which are clearly covered by those acts, the
new vehicles have created new questions of regulatory and intra-governmental policy which, despite the temptation to wait and see what judicial
resolution may be forthcoming, should be speedily subjected to congressional scrutiny and action. 77
B. Legislative

If a legislative solution is sought, the first question of policy to be
considered is whether these investment vehicles are really needed. The
variable annuity seems a beneficial method of providing for old age. It is
doubtful that Congress would want to regulate it out of existence. But it
may be asked whether the variable annuity device should be made available to large insurance companies or left to standard investment companies
385 (3d Cir. 1964). And at least one bank has registered its pooled H.R. 10 pension fund
offerings under the Securities Act. Wall Street J., Dec. 26, 1963, p. 2, col. 3. With short
form registration available, supra note 71, even the smaller banks and insurance companies
should be able to afford the cost of registration. But see Hearings 46.
73 Investment Company Act § 16.
74 Prudential Ins. Co. of America, SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 3620,
Jan. 22, 1963.
75 But see Note, 1963 DuKE L.J. 807, 814-15, suggesting some possible methods of
operation for an insurance company under the separate corporation requirement.
76 The hearings of May 20, 1963, referred to throughout the footnotes of the present
comment, were held for the specific purpose of seeking a solution to this threatened
duplication of federal regulatory effort. Hearings 3.
77 All three opinions in the VALIC case intimate that a congressional solution might
be best.
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and concerns such as VALIC, which issue only variable annuities7s_a
thorny question of policy the solution of which must depend on the airing
of the views of all camps at a legislative hearing.
As for the pooling of managing agency accounts, the bankers' strongest
argument in favor of this device is that it allows a bank to give more complete
service to its established customers who already have a number of dealings
with the bank.79 The weight of this argument is questionable in the face of
the fact that mutual funds presently provide exactly the same investment service and do so with all the investor safeguards of the federal securities laws,
often with investment analysis more comprehensive than that provided by
banks for agency account customers. Relaxation of the requirements of the
securities acts might, however, be justifiable in connection with the pooling
of managing agency accounts if the availability of that device were limited
to certain select customers. This could be done by restricting the pooling
to the managing agency accounts of customers who, for a preceding·period
of given duration, have maintained with the bank accounts of a specific
type and of a minimum value. Advertising of the pooling arrangement
would, of course, be tightly restricted in order to avoid "merchandising." 80
Further, the pooling of H.R. 10 pension funds seems almost inevitable.
Congress has already expressed a desire that banks (among others) handle
these funds. 81 If pooling is not allowed, many banks will not be able to
handle them because of the expense involved.82 Since, as mentioned abbve,
these funds are essentially long-range trust arrangements and not primarily
investment vehicles, it seems that Congress would be justified in allowing
their pooling even though some of the safeguards of the securities laws
cannot be provided. However, some periodic reporting requirements might
be appropriate to enable the investor to check on the progress and management of the fund. The investor, if dissatisfied, could then withdraw from
the fund simply by cancelling his consent to the pooling of his monies.
The biggest obstacle under the securities laws to the use of pooled
managing agency accounts by banks and the sale of variable annuities
by large insurance companies is the election-of-directors requirement of
the Investment Company Act, for this provision necessitates the establishment of a separate corporation. If Congress decides that the banks and
insurance companies should be allowed to utilize these investment vehicles
without setting up separate corporations, such an elimination of the
78 A large segment of the insurance industry, led by the Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company, is opposed to the issuance of variable annuities by insurance companies. They
fear that low returns on variable annuities during market declines would destroy public
confidence in the traditionally stable insurance industry. Note, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 206,207.
79 Hearings SI.
so "Open" advertising of managing agency account pools is currently forbidden by
Regulation 9, § 9.18(b)(5)(iv), but it may be doubted whether this provision is sufficiently
strict. See note 45 supra.
81 The statute specifically provides for the eventuality of a bank's serving as the trustee.
INT. REv. CooE OF 1954, § 40l(d)(l).
82 See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
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election-of-directors requirement could conceivably be justified. If the investor is kept well-informed through required periodic reports, he can
express his dissatisfaction with the management by withdrawing from the
fund. 83 Dispensing with the requirement of a separate corporation would
probably raise the temptation toward self-dealing as between the fund and
the sponsoring institution, since the sponsor's directors would be the ultimate managers of the fund, but such temptations might be reduced by a
tightening of the prohibitions against self-dealing presently included in the
Investment Company Act. Other safeguards of the securities laws, such as
the provision giving the investment fund participants the right to vote on
proposed changes in investment policy, could be applied intact to these
funds, even though such funds are not separately incorporated.
The fundamental legislative objective which must pervade Congress'
deliberations on the present controversy is substantive uniformity of regulation. Variable annuities and pooled managing agency accounts are essentially mutual funds. To discard uniformity of regulation in this area would
be to give some institutions certain administrative advantages which others
engaged in _substantially the same business do not enjoy. This is not to say
that the details of the methods of regulation must necessarily be identical,
but merely that the impact of the regulation must be uniform throughout
the industry.84 If any of the investor safeguards which surround mutual
fund operations must be dispensed with to permit the participation of
banks and general insurance companies in the collective investment business, as to them a compensating reinforcement of the remaining safeguards
is necessary. It is clear that reconciliation of the diverse interests involved
in the present controversy will require a delicacy of balance unobtainable
in the courtroom. Resolution of the conflicting policies, which were not
within the purview of Congress when it enacted the existing federal securities laws, should be left to that body. And this question should be acted
upon by Congress before judicial pronouncements, not based on the kind
of investigation of current conditions which Congress is able to undertake,
force changes in the structure of the collective investment industry different
from those which Congress might wish to make-changes possibly deleterious to a prompt realization of the structure which Congress may ultimately
conclude is best for the industry.85
John W. Erickson
83 Such a withdrawal from an annuity fund after the annuitant has begun to receive
monthly payments might seem inconceivable. However, the annuitant need not be "locked
in" as he is under the present contracts. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65,
89 (1959) (concurring opinion of Brennan, J.). The contracts could provide that, until the
date of his actuarially predicted demise, he may recover a cash surrender value based on
the value of the number of units remaining to be paid between the date of withdrawal
and the predicted date of his death. After that predicted date he will have recovered his
original investment and will no longer need the protection afforded by the withdrawal
right.
84 As before, an exception should be noted with respect to the essentially different
H.R. 10 pension trust pools.
85 Three almost identical bills have been introduced-two in the House, one in

